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The current system for compensating victims of medical accidents
is primarily a fault-and-liability-insurance system. Generally this system provides for compensation only when a physician or some other
person assisting in the treatment of a patient has been negligent. Ordinarily the physician or assistant, or some legal entity that is vicariously responsible, has medical malpractice coverage-a form of liability insurance. Thus, most payments in compensation for injuries and
losses resulting from medical accidents are made by liability insurers.
In its dependence on these key features of fault law and liability
insurance, the current system for compensating victims of medical accidents is similar to the matured fault-and-liability-insurance system
that had developed for traffic victims by the 1960's, before significant
moves toward a loss insurance system-now commonly called "nofault" or "nonfault"--began to occur. Do changes in methods of compensating traffic victims portend like changes in the system for compensating victims of medical accidents? Are the reasons for change in
the first of these areas applicable also to the other? In order to answer
these questions, we shall need to examine the two areas more closely
than is necessary merely to identify the key features to which we have
thus far adverted. As Professor Morris has reminded us, "Reasons for
taking money from defendants [in tort actions] differ sharply in various types of cases .

.

. ."' And even though in a very general sense

"there is a central theme or basis or idea, running through the cases
of what are called torts, which, while it is difficult to put into words,
does distinguish them in a greater or less degree from other types of
cases, 72 still the "heterogeneous law of torts did not grow up because
it was inspired by any one integrating principle."3 Not even the principle of basing awards on fault, which in the nineteenth century
achieved the status of an axiom in tort law, ever became the unifying
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.BA. 1940, LL.B. 1941, University of
Texas; S.J.D. 1956, Harvard University. This Article is a revised and expanded version
of a paper initially prepared for a conference at The Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, in September, 1971. The author gratefully
acknowledges The Center's consent to this publication.
I C. VoRms, ToRTs 10 (1953).
2 W. PRossER, TORTS 2 (4th ed. 1971).

3 James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 Btrr. L.
REv. 315 (1959).
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theme.4 Neither should we expect in the future to find a unifying
theme in some other single principle. Law generally, and tort law particularly, must accommodate multiple interests and objectives. No one
principle, relentlessly pursued, will achieve an acceptable accommodation. What, then, are the prospects for change in the medical accident
compensation system during this period of pending reform of the system for compensating traffic victims?
I.

CRITICISMS OF MALPRACTICE LAW AND
AUTOMOBILE LAW COMPARED

From the data and polemics advanced in the controversy over
automobile insurance reform, massive though the exchange has been,
one can glean a finite number of charges and countercharges. The
paragraphs that follow include summary statements of the grounds of
indictment of the matured fault-and-liability-insurance system for
compensating traffic victims.5 This Article does not develop the response and countercharges of those who favor retention of that system.6 Rather, it considers the extent to which grounds of indictment
and proposals for reform of that system are or are not transferable to
the field of medical malpractice. In the present section of the Article,
a stated ground of indictment of the system for traffic victims is followed by consideration of its applicability to medical accidents.
First. The negligence system [for compensation of traffic victims] is an incomplete system of reparation. It leaves
victims themselves to bear much accidental loss that could
easily be paid through insurance. It denies recovery altogether to some injured persons, and it underpays others.
Moreover, the system would be subject to even more severe
condemnation on this ground of incompleteness if it were
faithful to its underlying theories of basing liability on negligence and denying recovery because of contributory negli4

See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868).
5
These summary statements are taken from P. KETON & R. KEaTON, CASES Am

MATEIALS ON THE LAW Or TORTS 458 (1971), reprinted as

COPENSATION SYsTEms-

THE SEARCH: POR A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO NEGIaGENCE LAW 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as COMPENSATION SYsTaissl. Of the eight major criticisms stated in Compensation
Systems, only the first four are quoted and discussed in this Article.
6For statements of the case for retention of the fault-and-liability-insurance system, see, e.g., ABA SPECIAL CoinarTEE ON AUTOmOBiL ACCIDENT REPARATIONS, REPORT
(1969), recommendations from which are reprinted at 55 A.B.A.J. 970, 972-75 (1969);
AwmmcAx COLLEGE Or TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMiENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMffITT
ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS (1971); DEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, AUTO MOBILE INSURANCE: THE ROCxxFELER-STEwART PLAN (1970); The
Automobile Insurance Problem, 6 TRIAL, Oct./Nov., 1970, at 8. A summary of both
charges and countercharges appears in INSTITUTE FOR THE FUTURE, THE AUToMoB.E
INSURANCE SYSTEM: CURRENT STATUS AND SOME PROPOSED REVISIONS (rev. Feb. 1972).
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gence (or, in a growing number of states, proportionately
reducing recovery on this ground).7
The charge of incompleteness certainly applies to the medical malpractice system. But the reasons for incompleteness and the nature of
the gaps are rather different. Also, a catalog of the gaps and reasons
for them in the malpractice system today would differ markedly from
a catalog for even a decade earlier, and the more so from a catalog for
a half century earlier.
Through the first half of this century the medical malpractice system was so heavily weighted against the victim that it bore more resemblance to the system for employee compensation just before workmen's compensation laws than to the traffic-victim system just before
nonfault laws. The percentage of traffic victims actually compensated
to some extent was rising from decade to decade of the twentieth century, and by the 1960's many more victims were actually compensated
(though sometimes inadequately) than faithful adherence to the theory
of the system (including contributory fault as a complete defense)
would have permitted. 8 In contrast, the victims of medical accidents
actually compensated were until recent years, and perhaps still are, a
small percentage of the total number of victims of medical accidents.'
Just how small a percentage remains a matter of speculation. There
have been no comprehensive empirical studies of the compensation of
malpractice victims comparable to the studies concerning traffic victims. Yet, curiously, current criticisms of the malpractice system are
less often directed against gaps of coverage than against sharply rising
costs and vulnerability of physicians to malpractice claims."0 Closing
7 COMPENSATION SYSTEMS, supra note 5, at 2.
8 Concerning the practical performance of the fault-and-liability-insurance system
in compensating traffic victims, see COLUMBIA UNIvTEsrrY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932); A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTz & R. BOmBAU0H,
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); 1, 2 U.S. DEP'T oF TRANSPORTATION,
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES, REPORT OF =H WESTAT
RESEARCH CORP. (1970); Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation's Auto Insur-

ance Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 207 (1971);
Morris & Paul, The FinancialImpact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913
(1962). The findings of the empirical studies through 1964 are summarized and compared in R. KEETON & J. O'CouNNEL, BASIC PROTECTION rOR TIE TRAFFIC VICTIM 34-69
(1965).
9
See, e.g., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4 (D. McDonald ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
MALPRACTICE] reporting that the consensus of participants in a conference at The Center

for the Study of Democratic Institutions, held at Santa Barbara, California, in September, 1971, "was that most people who sustain medical injuries, either through negligence
or unavoidable accident, do not get into the claims system. They receive no compensation."
10Potomac Associates commissioned surveys of public opinion by the Gallup
Organization in 1971 and 1972 and a survey of opinions of U.S. physicians by Erdos
and Morgan, Inc., in 1971. S.STRIcKLAND, U.S. HEALTH CARE 16-17 (1972). Physicians
ranked the "vulnerability of doctors to malpractice suits" as third among "the most
pressing problems for national health," the first two being the "high cost of medical
care for most people" and "not enough M.D.'s." Id. 41, 121. The suggestive list sub-
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these gaps would add to costs. The additions to cost resulting from
gap-closing would be more substantial than they have been in the reforms of the traffic system; thus it would seem doubtful that a viable
reform could be devised with sufficient cost-cutting features to produce
a net cost reduction comparable to that flowing from some nonfault
automobile insurance plans."
mitted to persons interviewed in the public opinion survey did not include doctors'
vulnerability to malpractice suits. However, among the things "likely to be most
responsible" for "a national crisis in the health and medical area" about which "[tihere
is a lot of talk nowadays," the list used in the public opinion survey did include the
suggestion that "[mjost health insurance plans are too complicated and too expensive."
Id. 112-13. Persons interviewed ranked this item, identified in a table as "costly and
complicated insurance," second only to the shortage of doctors as likely to be most
responsible for the crisis. Id. 37. This table reporting results of the public opinion survey
also shows "high cost of medical treatment" ranking seventh, in contrast with the
physicians' ranking "high cost of medical treatment" first. The contrast tempts one to
infer that the public would rather blame insurers than physicians for high costs. But
a close examination of the suggestive list used in the public opinion survey weakens
this inference. The item in the suggestive list that corresponds with "high cost of medical
treatment" in the chart was phrased in a materially different way--"[olnly those who
can afford it get the good medical treatment." Id. 113. In view of these and other
differences in survey methods, inferences that public and physician attitudes differ in
particular ways are necessarily very speculative.
11 Concerning predictions of cost reductions from adoption of nonfault automobile
insurance, see, e.g., AMRIcAN INSuRANcE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY AND EvALUATE THE KEETON-O'CoNNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS 13-16 (1968); F. HARWAYNE, AUTOMOBILE BASIC PROTECTON COSTS EVALUATED (1968) (multilithed, with Foreword of December, 1968,
comparing findings of Harwayne's earlier studies with those of the AIA report); NEw
YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR WHosE BENEXIT?
143-46 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. INs. DEP'T REPORT]; Harwayne, Insurance
Costs of Basic Protection Plan in Michigan, 1967 U. IL. L. FORUM 479, reprinted in
CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 119 (R. Keeton, J. O'Connell & J. McCord eds. 1968). For
a contrasting view, see AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE ALLIANCE ACTUAImL CoMMITTEE,

ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE ADEQUACY oi THm CosTINo

op TH AMERICAN INSURANCE

ASsOCIATIoN's "COMP-LETE PERSONAL PROTECTION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLAN" (1969).
As this Article goes to press, Massachusetts is the only state from which substantial data
on the actual performance of a nonfault plan are available, since it was the only state
having such a plan in operation before January 1, 1972. Its nonfault law became effective January 1, 1971. Although it was generally agreed that rates would have to be
increased 20% to 30% in 1971 in the absence of a change in the law (the size of the
increase being due in part to a four-year rate freeze), rate reductions achieved under
the Massachusetts nonfault law have been substantial. For example, the 1970 rate for
compulsory bodily injury coverage (liability insurance with limits of $5,000 per person
and $10,000 per accident) for under-25 male car owners in Boston, without driver
training, was $374. For this class of persons, the 1971 rate for compulsory bodily injury
coverage (including liability insurance with limits of $5,000 per person and $10,000
per accident and nonfault insurance with a limit of $2,000 per person) was reduced
to $318. For the same coverage, the rate established for 1972 was $237. Boston Globe,
Dec. 15, 1971, at 1, col. 1, at 11, col. 1. In October, 1972, a long controversy over rebates
for 1971 terminated in an order requiring a rebate of $82.46 of the $318 paid by the
class of Boston drivers identified above, which is the class paying the highest rate in
the state. The Standard: The Northeast's Insurance Weekly, Oct. 20, 1972, at 28. Thus,
costs of compulsory bodily injury coverage to Massachusetts motorists in 1971 and 1972
were about half what they would have been if the law had not been changed. Note,
however, that these figures concern compulsory bodily injury coverage only. Costs of
property damage coverages continued to rise. Speaking of the combined costs the Commissioner of Insurance in Massachusetts stated in December, 1971, that savings in bodily
injury costs would more than offset expected increases in rates for property damage
coverages, with the result that, despite continuing trends of higher costs from other
factors not affected by the enactment of nonfault legislation, the average motorist's
total automobile insurance bill for 1972 would be 10% lower than in 1971. Boston Globe
Dec. 15, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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In great part this contrast between the systems for medical and
traffic victims can be traced to different reasons for the gaps between
losses and available compensation. First, the negligence issue in traffic
cases ordinarily depends upon lay testimony, and the victim can present evidence that makes a case for the jury in most instances. In contrast, the negligence issue in malpractice cases usually depends on expert testimony, which even today is difficult to obtain, despite great
changes in this respect during the last decade or two. Second, the causation issue is far more complex and troublesome in malpractice cases
than in traffic cases. Only occasionally do traffic injury cases present
difficult issues of medical causation. In malpractice cases, on the other
hand, a difficult causation issue is par for the course. ' The patient
seeks treatment because he has some condition that troubles him. Is
the condition of which he later complains one arising not solely from
that earlier condition but in part at least from negligent medical treatment? If so, for what part of the later condition is the defendant in the
malpractice action accountable? In several ways, these difficult questions of "cause in fact" and "legal cause" present very different issues
in relation to reform of the malpractice compensation system from
those confronted in relation to the traffic accident system. One difference, already suggested, is that these causation issues have contributed
to gaps between losses caused and compensation paid because even
some victims who deserve compensation under the substantive law
standards are unable to meet their burden of proof. Another difference
bears on the framing of any reform proposal. Though a reform can
easily eliminate the negligence issue by adopting a nonfault principle,
what can it do about the causation issue? Does the causation problem
make nonfault insurance a less viable alternative here than in relation
to traffic injuries? Can one devise a satisfactory way of dealing with
the issue in a nonfault system? Unless this last question can be answered affirmatively, the causation problem exerts a strong push toward
a more comprehensive system of compensation-a social security system-in which a broader criterion for entitlement to compensation
would bypass the causation issue.
Second. The negligence system [for compensation of
traffic victims] is inequitable. It heavily overpays some
claimants while underpaying others who are equally or more
deserving. It is especially unfair in overpaying those with
trivial injuries and underpaying those who are most severely
12See D. LoulsExL & H. WILLims, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ff 8.07 (1970, Supp.
1972). The 1972 Supplement cites 37 recent cases, reaching appellate courts from 1960
to 1972 inclusive, in which proximate cause was in issue. These appellate opinions are,
of course, only the tip of the iceberg. See also MALPAcTiCE, supra note 9, at 18.
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injured. Moreover, the unfairness of the system extends also

to the way it allocates the burden of paying for the costs of
the system. 13
These criticisms of the system for compensating traffic victims
have been thoroughly documented in a long series of empirical studies
commencing with the Columbia Study published in 193214 and extending most recently to studies under the auspices of the United States
Department of Transportation. 5 One cannot speak with comparable
assurance about the extent to which they are or are not applicable to
the medical malpractice system. I would speculate that these specific
charges are not applicable to the malpractice system, though that system may be more inequitable in other ways than the traffic system has
been.
There has been great inequity in the malpractice system as between physicians and victims because, as suggested earlier, the system
has been heavily weighted against the victim's being able to meet his
burden of proof on the negligence and causation issues. In this respect
the malpractice system has been harsher than the traffic compensation
system in its treatment of victims. The recent dramatic increases in
costs of malpractice insurance16 surely reflect some change in this respect. Whether the malpractice system is still subject to criticism on
this ground of failing in practice to measure up to its own theory of
substantive rights is open to question.
The most forceful and most thoroughly documented criticisms of
inequity in the system applying to traffic accidents, referred to in the
quotation above, do not concern inequity between victims as a class
and motorists as a class-a kind of inequity that would be comparable
to inequity between patients as a class and physicians as a class? 7 In3

SATION SYsTnms, supra note 5, at 2.
CoLvUmA Ukrasrmr
CouNcrr. EoR REsEARCH

1 COMUE
14

ic m n

SocrAL Scm cEs, supra

note 8.
15U.S. DEP'T or TRaNsPoRTATiON, supra note 8.

10 Speaking at a seminar of doctors on March 3, 1972, an insurance executive
reported:
Coverage that would have cost New York surgeons $1,000 in 1966 costs
more than $4,000 now. The Los Angeles Medical Association reported several
years ago that the average premium for its physicians and surgeons was $5,000
annually. Some in high-risk specialties pay $12,000 and more a year. The AMA
reports that some physicians who have lost lawsuits must pay as much as
$28,000 on renewal, with a $5,000 deductible clause.
Address by Ellsworth Calhoun, Malpractice Seminar for Doctors, Miami Beach, Mar. 3,
1972, at 3.
17Some of the identified inequities, however, are comparable to inequity between
patients and physicians. An example occurs when the fault-and-liability-insurance system
fails to compensate the innocent pedestrian who is struck by a car that is out of control
because the driver lost consciousness without negligence. One may see this as favoring
motorists over pedestrians-or failing to require that "motoring pay its way." See R.
KEET N & J. O'CoNwEL, supra note 8, at 257-60.
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stead, they concern inequity among victims and inequity among premium-paying motorists. We have no documentation for inequity of
these types in the malpractice system. The nuisance increment to the
value of a trivial claim by a traffic victim is a major factor in the inequities of the traffic system. In contrast, physicians have good reason
to exert much more pressure against nuisance settlements than do motorists. Moreover, the expense of preparation and presentation of the
claim is much higher for the malpractice claimant than for the traffic
claimant.1 8 These factors would tend to deny nuisance value to claims
for trivial loss.
It may be that there are other kinds of inequities among victims
or inequities among physicians in the malpractice system, but if so
they remain to be documented. One suggestion is that there is an inequity among victims of medical accidents exactly the reverse of that
among traffic victims. A victim of medical malpractice who sustains
only a minor or moderate injury, rather than being overpaid in comparison with one severely injured, receives nothing at all. Attorneys
are reluctant to take these cases "because the malpractice insurance
carriers will not settle, and it just costs too much money for the plaintiff's attorney to try them."' 9 Traffic victims face a different problem:
Third. The system [for compensating traffic victims] is
too slow in delivering the payments it makes. Such delay adversely affects rehabilitation of injured persons and increases
the overall social costs of accidents ....

The burden of these

negligence cases on the courts also adversely affects court
dockets
and the administration of justice in other cases as
20
well.

Here again the criticisms of the system for compensating traffic
victims are thoroughly supported by empirical data,2 ' but no similar
documentation is available with respect to malpractice claims. Although delays in reaching lump-sum settlements or adjudications in
malpractice cases are probably as great as or greater than those in
traffic cases, it does not necessarily follow that the delays have the
same adverse effect on rehabilitation. It may well be, for example, that
victims of malpractice are more likely to have the benefit of needed
medical attention, though it seems doubtful that many of them would
be offered the kind of rehabilitative treatment that involves a substan18 Concerning the high cost of preparing a malpractice claim for trial, see, e.g., the
comment of David Rubsamen, M.D., LL.B., quoted in MALPRAcTiCE, supra note 9, at 4.

198Id.
20

COmpwSATIo
SYsT~ms, supra note 5, at 2.
21 See generally the studies cited in note 8 supra.
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tial outlay of expenses-for example, spending a period of weeks or
months at a specialized rehabilitation center.
With respect to the burden of claims on the court system, individual malpractice cases tend to involve even more lengthy and expensive trials than do traffic cases, but malpractice claims have been so
few in number compared with claims of traffic victims that they have
not taken a substantial percentage of court time and resources. Will
their number increase so dramatically that they become a significant
burden in the future?
Fourth. The negligence system [for compensation of
traffic victims] is wastefully expensive. Administrative cost
is high because of the nature of the two principal criteria for
compensation-requiring, first, case-by-case determinations
of fault and second, lump-sum findings of damages under indeterminate guidelines. The net amount that victims receive
is less than half of the liability insurance premium dollar.
A large part of the premium dollar-approximately a fourth
-is expended in claims administration cost. The disproportionately high expense of administration is especially severe
in cases of small claims, which constitute a heavy majority
of all claims filed.22
Individual malpractice cases are on average surely more expensive to try-both for the parties and for taxpayers-than individual
traffic accident cases. And the proportion of the malpractice insurance
premium dollar expended to meet the administrative costs of the system is probably higher than the proportion of the automobile liability
insurance premium dollar so expended." But the conclusion that this
expense is as wasteful in the malpractice as in the automobile insurance area does not follow. Nor does it follow that the expense could
be reduced as dramatically in the malpractice area as in the automobile insurance area by a shift to nonfault insurance. As noted earlier,
although a shift to nonfault insurance would eliminate the negligence
issue from claims based upon medical accidents, a serious causation
issue might remain in a high percentage of cases. Dealing with that issue would be administratively expensive. This factor would be an influence toward a broader, social-security type of system, rather than
nonfault insurance. The net benefits paid to traffic victims under nonfault private insurance are likely to be a considerably higher percent22

23

SATION SySms, supra note 5, at 2.
See MAX.pRAmCCE, supra note 9, at 4-5; SENATE SuBcoamm
COl

ON ExEcUIVE
REoRGANIATiON, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VmsUS
THE P rsICAN 10 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as RiBic0 r REPoRT].
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age of premiums than the 44 percent24 delivered by automobile bodily
injury liability insurance. The percentage delivered in net benefits will
still be lower, no doubt, than under a social security system. But a decisionmaker may see the difference as a reasonable price to pay for
what he judges to be a wiser and fairer distribution of burdens and
benefits than can be achieved under social security. That judgment
of the balance of costs and benefits will be more difficult to reach in
relation to victims of medical accidents because the difference in administrative costs of nonfault insurance and social security is likely to
be greater.
This judgment is likely to be affected, also, by the development
of a national health insurance plan to which coverage for medical accidents might be attached. Any such plan would cover much-and might
even cover all-of the medical-expense portion of losses resulting from
malpractice. It is less likely, however, that it would extend to compensation either for income loss or for general damages (for such things
as "pain and suffering").
In each of the foregoing comparisons we have begun with a statement in criticism of the system for compensating traffic victims, then
inquiring whether it, or a somewhat similar criticism, applies to the
area of medical malpractice. Are there other criticisms of the medical
malpractice system with no counterparts in the familiar grounds of indictment of the system for compensating traffic victims? 2 5 An affirmative answer seems justified.
A major criticism of the medical malpractice system is that it is
adversely affecting the patient-physician relationship and causing physicians to practice medicine conservatively and defensively (that is,
liability) rather than in ways
in a way that guards against malpractice
26
that might better serve their patients.
24

For the sources of data and method of calculation of this figure of 447, see
5, at 57-63. After initial publication, this calculation
was independently confirmed in N.Y. INS. DEP'T REPoRT, supra note 11, at 34-37.
25For a summary of criticisms of current medical malpractice adjudication "as a
means of arriving at objective, factual, and legal determinations of professional negligence,"
and a proposal for loss insurance as an alternative, see, e.g., Note, Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Some Suggested Improvements and a Possible Alternative, 18 U. FIA. L. REV.
623, 629 (1966). With respect to criticism of the system from the broad perspective of
social goals, see M. FRANX Lr , INjuRims Aim Rsmas 624-26 (1971); Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step Toward the Displacement
of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 279 (1964). See also McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VANO. L. REv. 549 (1959); Morris, Response to Ribicoff: Malpractice Suits vs. Patient Care, 37 INs. CouNsEL J. 206 (1970);
Uhthoff, Medical Malpractice-the Insurance Scene, 43 ST. JoiN's L. Rav. 578 (1969);
Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 333 (1963); Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common-Law Innovations, 45 Mm.
L. REV. 1019 (1961).
26
Note, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971
DuE LJ. 939. Varied views concerning this charge appear in MALPRAcTicE, supra
CoiPENsATIoN SYs.ms, supra note
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This criticism is related to the deterrent effect of liability, which
in the context of traffic cases is urged as a desirable feature of liability
systems. Here the argument is that the deterrent effect is excessive and
antisocial. What is deterred is not only carelessness but also the socially desirable risk-taking involved in courses of treatment offering increased chances of cure or improvement that more than counterbalance the increased risks they involve. No similar charge of antisocial
deterrence has been leveled at the fault-and-liability-insurance system
for compensating traffic victims. In this respect, then, there is a factor
weighing in favor of reform of the malpractice system that has not
been present in the controversy over automobile insurance reform.
Closely related to this last argument against the malpractice system is the charge that the heavy incentive toward defensive or conservative medical practice causes needless medical expense. Thus, it is
asserted, "We read reports of cases where the verdict has turned on
whether or not a certain test or X-ray was done when we know, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it would not have helped one iota."27
Regardless of the extent to which these reports are or are not wellfounded in fact, the physician who believes them has a strong inducement to recommend more and more tests, at more and more expense
to the patient and to the medical-services system.
A further consequence alleged to follow from physicians' increasing concern about malpractice claims is that despite the general shortage of medical personnel, a significant number of physicians are declining to undertake services in particular circumstances (especially in
emergency situations in which they would be treating persons with
whom they did not have the ordinary physician-patient rapport), withdrawing from the performance of procedures they are fully qualified
to perform, or even withdrawing from practice entirely by retiring
much earlier than they otherwise would have chosen to do.
It is also charged that the inducement toward withdrawal from
practice is accentuated in some areas of the country by such dramatic
increases in malpractice insurance premium rates, and even in unavailability of malpractice insurance, that some physicians find the choice
of continuing in practice economically as well as psychologically unattractive.
note 9, at 1, 3-4; RIBICOi' REPORT, supra note 23, at 2. See also Gorney, A Doctor's
Plea for Intelligent Compromise, 7 Tm, May/June, 1971, at 53:
It is stated that the deleterious effects of the malpractice crisis on the quality
of medicine are a 'blatant falsehood.' Do the learned members of the Bar really
believe that? Can it honestly be said that if one out of four lawyers were
threatened with a suit in the next five years, it would have no effect on their
attitudes and relations with their clientele? Might they not tend to be a little
more conservative in their approach? I think they would.
27

Gorney, supra note 26, at 53 (emphasis in original).
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The extent to which these several charges of adverse impact on
the practice of medicine will be borne out by empirical data remains to
be seen, but it is already clear that they are affecting the attitudes and
conduct of some percentage of the medical profession.
II.

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES
OF COMPENSATION SYSTEMS

The foregoing comparison of grounds of criticism of fault-andliability-insurance systems in the two contexts of traffic accidents and
medical accidents has led to occasional references to alternatives. It
may be useful, now, to consider alternative systems more directly, and
to examine also the objectives a good compensation system might
serve.
In the contexts of both traffic accidents and medical accidents,
proposed remedies for deficiencies in the existing system fall into three
major groups. One group would preserve the fault-and-liability-insurance system and continue to use it as the principal source of compensation for accident victims.2" A second group of proposals would replace the fault system with a nonfault (or no-fault or loss insurance)
system as the principal source of compensation.2 9 The third group
would use a social security system as the primary source of compensation for these injured victims and for other needy persons as well.80 A
distinctive set of principles underlies the varied proposals within each
of these three groups.
Two principles underlying a fault-and-liability-insurance system
are suggested by the name itself. The principle of basing awards on
fault became firmly established in Anglo-American tort law some time
in the nineteenth century.8 The blend with liability insurance was under way before that century closed, and was fully consummated by
the middle of the twentieth century. Every American state legislature
had chosen to impose some degree of coercion on motorists to encourage, if not to compel, the purchase of motor vehicle liability insur28 In relation to claims of traffic victims, see, e.g., the publications cited in note 6
supra. In relation to malpractice claims, see, e.g., MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at 2-8.
29 In relation to claims of traffic victims, see, e.g., the proposals summarized in
coMPENsATION SYSTEms, supra note 5, at 20-44. In relation to claims of victims of
medical accidents, see, e.g., MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at 13-21.
8OSee, e.g., T. IsoN, THE FoRENsic LOTTY (1967); RoYAL ComaissIoN Op INQUIRY, COM:pENSATION rOR PERSONAL INjuRY iN NEW ZEALAND (1967) (commonly
referred to as the Woodhouse Report, Mr. Justice Owen Woodhouse having served as
Chairman of the Commission); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967).
81 See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, TORTs §§ 12.1-12.3 (1956); James, Tort Law
in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 Brr. L. REv. 315, 316-17 (1959).

19731

COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL ACCIDENTS

ance.3 2 A third underlying principle has commonly been an assumed
premise rarely adverted to in discussions of reform-the principle of
providing the liability insurance through private-enterprise insurers.
In contrast, "nonfault" does not so clearly suggest the principles
that became associated with that term during the controversy over automobile insurance reform in the 1960's. In one sense any compensation system that uses criteria other than fault to determine entitlement
to benefits might be called nonfault in character. In that broad sense,
social security systems are nonfault in character, and so are life insurance, fire insurance, and indeed all other forms of insurance except
liability insurance. But in the context of the automobile accident reparations controversy "nonfault" came to be used generally to signify
a system with these underlying principles: first, the principle of paying benefits without regard to fault; second, the principle of paying
these benefits through private-enterprise insurers; and, third, using
these nonfault, private-enterprise payments as the principal source of
compensation for victims who sustain injuries within the scope of the
insurance contracts. A very significant corollary of the third principle
is that there be a partial or total exemption from liability based on
negligence. This corollary is inherently more closely identified with
any notion of a "nonfault system" than might appear superficially. A
restriction upon liability for negligence, either total or at least very
substantial, is a necessary condition if a system is to be primarily nonfault in character-if the principal source of compensation is to be insurance benefits paid without regard to fault. Absent such a restriction,
damages based on negligence, awarded either to victims or to subrogated insurers, might have a more significant role in the system than
the insurance benefits paid without regard to fault.
The two principles underlying a social security system, as that
phrase will be used here, are, first, government management and funding and, second, the use of criteria for compensation that not only dispense with fault but also, ordinarily, are more closely related to the
need for benefits than to causes of the need.
This three-fold grouping of proposals, like many other systems of
classification, draws bright lines in gray areas. One can easily imagine,
for example, a system that pays substantial insurance benefits to victims without regard to fault and restricts awards of damages based
upon negligence but allows claims by victims and subrogated insurers,
based upon negligence, that are about equal in significance to the nonfault benefits. In such a case it may be debatable whether the system
should be classified as belonging to the first or instead to the second
32

See

R. KEETON & J. O'CoNxELL, supra note 8, at 102-09 & Appendix C.
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of the three groups identified here. Similarly, a system might so combine benefits from a government fund with further rights of recovery
-either from fault or nonfault private insurance--that it would be debatable whether the system should be classified in the third category,
or instead in the first or second. This classification system can nevertheless be a useful tool in comparing varied proposals and identifying
their main tendencies and emphases.
It is also significant that the characteristics of different systems
identified by these three sets of principles are fundamentally related
to the objectives a good compensation system might serve. In one
sense-a very particularized sense-we cannot fully define our objectives until we have assessed and evaluated even the most intricate details of a system and of the criteria we use to judge it. To answer fully
an inquiry about objectives in this particularized sense would be to
prescribe in greater detail than any legislature has ever done. It would
be to prescribe explicitly, and with stated purpose, for all those interstitial problems one must resolve in applying a system to cases at hand.
The impossibility of attaining such completeness of statement is no
reason for abandoning efforts to achieve a relatively particularized answer to an inquiry about objectives. But it is also useful, and perhaps
appropriately an earlier order of business, to approach the inquiry
about objectives in a relatively generalized way. One consequence of
doing so is to identify consensus. Although formulating objectives with
only that degree of generality that produces consensus conceals real
differences, so too formulating objectives with only that degree of particularity that provokes dissent conceals whatever measure of consensus may exist. It also obscures the boundaries of an area, between consensus and disabling dissension, within which reform is a realistic
possibility. It may be instructive, then, to consider how far we can
move toward the particular from the most general statement of aims
-for example, that the compensation system be equitable, fair, and
just-before consensus disappears. Ordinarily it will be impossible to
support speculations about consensus empirically, but it nevertheless
seems likely that on several points there will be wide agreement. Some
or all of the later points suggested here may be seen as no more than
corollaries of the first two, but perhaps they -merit the attention of
separate statement.3
33 1 gratefully acknowledge that in this section I have drawn heavily on ideas
developed in the study of compensation of traffic victims in which Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell was my colleague; see particularly R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNa',Lr, supra note 8,
at 241-72. Also, more expanded treatments of some of the ideas invoked here appear in
COMPENSATION SYsTSms,

supra note 5, at 63-66; R.

KEETON, VENTURING TO

Do

JusTIcE

126-66 (1969). I gratefully acknowledge that I have drawn also upon G. CAanamxSI, THm
CosTs oF AccaxmNTs 24-33 (1970); NEW YoRx INs. DEPIT REoRT, supra note 11, at

57-79.
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First, a good system of compensation will be equitable, and it will
be so from each of three different perspectives-between those who receive its benefits and those who bear the burden of its costs, among
different beneficiaries, and among different cost-bearers.
Second, the system will contribute to the protection, enhancement,
and wise allocation of society's human and economic resources.34
Third, the system will compensate promptly. It will meet economic burdens as they occur, and it will provide for medical and other
rehabilitative services as they are needed.
Fourth, the system will be reliable. It will give assurance of financial responsibility for the payment of compensation determined to be
due, and the determinations of entitlement to benefits and responsibility for costs will be predictable.
Fifth, the system will distribute losses rather than impose or leave
crushing burdens on individuals.
Sixth, the system will be efficient, minimizing waste and overhead.
Seventh, the system will avoid inducements and, if feasible, provide affirmative deterrents to antisocially risky conduct.
Eighth, the system will minimize inducements to exaggeration and
fraud and opportunities for profit from such conduct. This is essential
to the integrity and equity of the system and to cost.control as well.
On the substance of this very general statement of objectives consensus seems likely, regardless of varied preferences for form of statement. What kinds of differences emerge, however, as we move from
such a general statement to some degree of specification? And how are
these differences related to the three sets of principles-fault, non84 Professor Calabresi identifies "the principal goals of any system of accident law"
as just two: "First, it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce the costs of accidents."
G. CALAS RESI supra note 33, at 24. He adds:
More important, claims that particular systems are just, like those that
justice is in some sense a goal concurrent with accident cost reduction, fail to
ring true. They seem to suggest that a 'rather unjust' system may be worthwhile
because it diminishes accident costs effectively; or, conversely, that there is one
system that can be termed just to the exclusion of all others, i.e. that is supported by justice in the same sense that economic efficiency may prefer one
system to all others. But the words just and unjust do not sound right to me
in either of the statements. They ring true in rather different contexts, as when
we say that we reject a particular system or parts of it as unjust, or that a
system taken as a whole does not violate our sense of justice. This suggests that
justice is a totally different order of goal from accident cost reduction. Indeed, it
suggests that it is not a goal but rather a constraint that can impose a veto on
systems or on the use of particular devices or structures within a given system
(e.g. administrative tribunals under the fault system) even though those same
structures might not be unjust in another system (e.g. administrative tribunals
under workmen's compensation).
Id. 25.
Will this framework of analysis tend to assign somewhat greater weight to economic
factors and less to intangible values than they deserve? Perhaps concerns on this ground
will be assuaged for most readers by Professor Calabresi's assurances that he does not
intend to disparage values implicit in the goal of compensating victims. See id. 26-28.
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fault, and social security-that compete for dominance in compensation systems?
No doubt partisans of any social security system would be as
quick as the partisans of either of the other two types of systems to
claim for it an objective of equity. But the consensus disappears
quickly as criteria of equity are stated. To serve the goal of fairness,
the broadest of social security systems would aim at compensating
every person in need. In contrast, a nonfault system limits its aim to
compensating for fortuitous losses within the scope of a defined insurance coverage. And a fault-and-liability-insurance system tailors its
criteria for compensation to a concept of equity concerned with fault.
Not all social security systems have an aim as broad as need, however. Some systems that are commonly referred to as social security
apply to limited types of need. The Puerto Rican automobile compensation system is an example. It is closely similar in some ways to nonfault automobile insurance systems adopted in several states, though
it sharply differs in its method of financing and operation 5 In Puerto
Rico, each motor vehicle owner pays a fee to a government agency
when he registers his car, and another government agency administers
the claims for compensation. If the system is fully funded from fees
properly tailored to the costs of compensation arising from accidents
within the period for which the fees are paid, the system is in essence
one of insurance, though social insurance rather than private insurance.
A key distinction between a social security system designed to
serve a limited class of victims and one designed to serve broadly
those members of the society who are in need is that the latter is
founded on a welfare objective. The aim is not to distinguish between
the "deserving" and "undeserving" victims of misfortune, as a faultand-liability-insurance system seeks to do, 6 but rather to compensate
the victims of accidents or illness or other misfortunes simply because
they are needy.
85 The acts of Puerto Rico, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, and
New Jersey are alike in having a partial tort exemption. That is, in order to receive
damages for pain and suffering, based on negligence, the claimant must establish that
his case is of a type beyond a threshold of severity as defined in the act. There is a
contrast, on the other hand, in that the nonfault benefits are paid from a state fund in
Puerto Rico but from private insurance companies under the other acts. For a description of the Puerto Rican Plan, see Aponte & Denenberg, The Automobile Problem in
Puerto Rico: Dimensions and Proposed Solution, 35 3. Rlsx & INs. 227 (1968) (also
published with updating amendments in 1968 INs. L.J. 884); An Addendum, 35 J. Risx
& INs. 637 (1968). The other acts are as follows: Pub. Act No. 273, [1972J Conn. Leg.
Serv. 567; FrA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-41 (1972); Mass. Acts 1970, ch. 670 (codified
in scattered sections of MAss. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 90, 175, 231 (Supp. 1972)); Pub. Act
No. 294, 1972 West's Mich. Leg. Serv. 707; N.J. Laws 1972, ch. 70, [19723 NJ. Seas. L.
Serv. 180.
36 Cf. W. BLum & H. KALVEN, PuBLic LAw PERSPECTnvES ON A PaivAT LAw
PROBLEm-AuTo CompNmSATiON PLWs 34 (1965), also published in 31 U. Cm. L. Rv.
641, 672 (1964). For a criticism of the Blum & Kalven thesis, see R. KEF.TON & 3.

O'CoNNELL, supra note 8, at 224-25.
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As we translate the demand for equity into more specific demands,
one dispute that emerges quickly concerns the choice between selective and comprehensive criteria for determining who shall receive
benefits. Increasingly there is support for using a very comprehensive
criterion at least in relation to a subsistence level of benefits. Under
this view, a good system of compensation will provide at least a subsistence level of compensation for all the victims of fortuitous loss of
the type with which the system is concerned, rather than denying
compensation altogether in some instances." Negligence law, on the
other hand, is founded on the premise that it is equitable that fault
be the basis for shifting loss. The objective is not to compensate all
accidental losses, but to compensate when and only when it is fair
and just to do so. The best justification for the negligence principle is
an appeal not to reason but to an assertion of commonly shared values8"
-even though it is an assertion increasingly challenged in recent
decades 8
The technique for achieving equity in a pure negligence system
(unadulterated by liability insurance) is the shifting of loss from individual to individual-from the careful to the careless. It is also implicit
that some losses will not be shifted. This includes not only all4" or
partl of the loss a person suffers as a result of his own negligence
but also any loss resulting from a so-called unavoidable accident-one
occurring without negligence.
If we had no choice but to place the burden of a loss on an innocent person who suffered it or a careless person who caused it, we
would be hard pressed to find any cogent basis for challenging negligence law. No doubt courts in which negligence principles were initially
fashioned saw the choice as being that limited. The invention of
liability insurance revealed a wider range of possibilities.
In one respect, liability insurance supplements and reinforces
negligence law in fulfilling the objective of compensating the innocent
victim of a negligent actor. Absent liability insurance, compensation
legally owing would often be unavailable in fact because of the financial irresponsibility of the wrongdoer. Every state has adopted laws
imposing some degree of coercion on motorists to obtain liability in37 Cf. N.Y. INs. DW'T REPoRT, supra note 11, at 62-63, proposing far more than
merely subsistence-level benefits for all traffic victims.
S8For a more extended development of this point, see R. KEEToN, VETUFmsG To Do
JusTicE 151-56 (1969).
39 Id. 156-66.
40 This will occur when contributory negligence is a full defense (the rule that has
prevailed in the past).
41 This will occur when contributory negligence is a partial defense, as will soon be
the case in most American states if current trends continue.
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surance up to minimum limits, thus improving the victim's chances
of receiving compensation for his injuries.42 In this way liability
insurance has been used to serve the objective of assuring payment of
benefits determined to be due. The element of liability insurance has
also made it possible for the fault-and-liability-insurance system to
serve the additional objective of minimizing total loss by distributing
a loss nominally imposed on an individual wrongdoer so as to avoid
the secondary harm that might otherwise result from its crushing
impact on that single individual.
In another respect, liability insurance tends to contradict and
impede fulfillment of an objective of negligence law-the objective
of deterring antisocially dangerous conduct. Whatever deterrent effect
inheres in individual liability for damages is weakened when all or
part of the judgment, as well as costs of defense against the claim, are
borne for the wrongdoer by his liability insurer.4 3 If the objective oi
deterrence is still to be served as well as it might be if individual
wrongdoers were required to pay judgments, other means than the
threat of liability must be used.
The assertion that negligence law deters antisocially dangerous
conduct44 is one of the principal arguments advanced by proponents
of fault-and-liability-insurance systems. This claim has long been
46
doubted, 45 and it has been increasingly challenged in recent years.
But one who challenges the claim that negligence law is an effective
deterrent may nevertheless support deterrence as an important objective of a system. He may support deterrents that operate through
moral or legal sanctions (including criminal sanctions) against defined
behavior. And he may support deterrents that operate through market
choices made in the light of the allocation of legal responsibility for
costs flowing from injuries. That is, he may support, as serving a
deterrent function, a system placing legal responsibility upon identified persons (or other legal entities) for hazards to which their activities or enterprises contribute.4 7 This goal can be accomplished either
42

See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CoNwELL, supra note 8, Appendix C.
See, e.g., N.Y. Iws. DEP'T REPORT, supra note 11, at 12-14. See also sources cited
in note 46 infra.
44
See, e.g., J. Kircher, Responsible Reform of the Present System: The Answerl
in FA-uLT OR NO-FAULT? 21, 30 (proceedings of Nat'l Conf. on Auto. Ins. Reform,
1970, Univ. of Minn., E. Maynes & C. Williams eds.), citing findings of a study commissioned by The Defense Research Institute.
45 2 F. HARPER & F. JAzmS, TORTS § 12.4 (1956).
46
See, e.g., 0. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AM DETERRENCE IN
HIGHWAY CRAsHas (U.S. Dep't of Transp. Auto Ins. & Comp. Study, July 1970);
Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 421 (1969).
47
The distinction between deterrents that operate through assigned legal responsi43
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48
by a system of strict liability or by a system of nonfault insurance.
The point is that imposing liability for an identifiable injury-causing
activity is a potential deterrent of that type of activity because of
the added expense liability attaches to it. The effectiveness of such a
deterrent depends more on the economic consequences of liability than
on the question whether the theory is nonfault (that is, either compulsory nonfault insurance or strict liability) or fault (that is, liability
based on negligence). Indeed, it may even be the case that either
compulsory nonfault insurance or strict liability, though imposed in
a way not implying moral censure, carries more force as a deterrent
than liability based on negligence. One reason this is so is that a
nonfault system may be more effective at "internalizing" costs. Typically a fault system allows some of the costs of a risky activity to be
externalized. For example, the costs of so-called "unavoidable" accidents-those in which no one can be proved to have been negligentare borne by individual victims under a negligence system, rather than
being treated as a part of the cost of the risky activity or activities
that contributed to the accident.
Through internalization of costs, then, legal responsibility and its
economic consequences, regardless of whether moral censure is implied,
may serve as a useful tool for society's discrimination between socially
useful activities, worth continuing even when the full cost of injuries
they cause is taken into account, and socially undesirable activities
persons will choose not to continue once they are forced to pay for
resulting injuries as well as other costs. Thus, both fault and nonfault
systems contain a potential cost-control mechanism ordinarily not
present in a social security system. This kind of cost control exists in
a social security system only if and to the extent that costs are allocated to loss-causing or risky activities rather than being paid out of
general tax revenues. Thus, nonfault and social security systems differ
in the extent to which they aim at imposing costs of the system on
bilities and those that operate through moral or legal sanctions against persons is parallel,
perhaps, with Professor Calabresi's distinction between the "'general deterrence' or
market method and the 'specific deterrence' or collective method." See G. CAsaRsr,
supra note 33, at 27.

48A system of strict liability supplemented by full liability insurance coverage
produces the result of distributing losses among the whole group of persons paying
premiums for that type of coverage. Except for possible differences in administrative
costs, the same result could be accomplished if the same persons paid the same premiums
for nonfault insurance covering the same losses. Thus, the choice between compulsory
nonfault insurance and strict liability supplemented by compulsory liability insurance is
essentially formal and does not compel different distributions of cost either among insureds or among insurers. Nor does it compel different practical consequences in other
respects. It is possible, nevertheless, to attach different consequences to the different
theories of liability, as by specifying different periods of time before a claim is barred
depending on whether it is a "contract" claim against one's own insurer or instead a

"1tort" claim of strict liability.
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particular activities, enterprises, or segments of society (making them
"pay their way") rather than meeting all or part of the costs out of
general tax revenues. 49 This point is closely related to another contrast
between social security and nonfault systems, already noted. That is,
social security systems tend to have broad application, paying benefits
to a large class of persons in society rather than to those who are
victims of a defined type of misfortune characteristic of any given type
of private insurance.
These last points of difference are only contrasts of tendency.
That is, one can devise a social security system paying benefits only
to the victims of a defined type of misfortune-as Puerto Rico has
done in relation to the compensation of traffic victims. And it can also
be a system that depends entirely on special charges for defined
activities, enterprises, or persons rather than depending even in part
on general tax revenues. But experience suggests that the pressures
for resort to general tax revenues for meeting some portion of the costs
of operating the system are well nigh irresistible under a governmentoperated system, and when such general public financing occurs, it
lends weight to other pressures for expanding the types of misfortunes
for which the system will pay benefits. Thus, to the extent that it is
thought desirable to maintain a cost accounting system for distinctive
enterprises and activities in society, a nonfault insurance system offers
practical advantages over a social security system.
Problems concerning equity and cost have emerged repeatedly in
this consideration of objectives that might be served by the various
types of compensation systems. Perhaps differences about how to
achieve equity at an acceptable cost are the main sources of controversy over the choices to be made.
Benefit costs-that is, the burden of supplying sums paid net to
victims-depend of course on the level and scope of benefits. As they
run higher, so do benefits, and vice versa. But there are other costs
that are not mirrored in benefits. Any system will have its leakageits costs of paying some "benefits" improperly claimed. Any system,
too, will have its administrative costs, to which we shall return shortly.
In addition, a system may incur increased or reduced costs according
to its tendency to affect loss-causing behavior. Thus, if a liability system (Whether based on fault, strict liability, or an obligation to provide nonfault insurance) is an effective deterrent of loss-causing
behavior, it reduces costs by reducing losses.
49 Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAm-s, TORTS §§ 13.1-13.2 (1956, Supp. 1968). Harper and
James appear to use "social insurance" in a sense broad enough to encompass both of
-the categories referred to in the present Article as nonfault insurance systems and
social security systems.
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Administrative costs also must be taken into account when one
is comparing cost control features of different systems. Administrative
costs run highest in a fault-and-liability-insurance system. This type
of system incurs heavy costs in determining fault case by case, as
well as determining that a particular act or course of conduct caused
the loss in question. A nonfault system escapes the first of these
sources of administrative cost but not the second. A broad social
security system escapes both these kinds of administrative costs.
Individualizing benefits is, from one perspective, another source
of significant administrative cost. From another perspective it is an
additional facet of the dispute over implementing the objective of
equity.r0 Individualized compensation is tailored to the distinctive
losses of the victim and takes account of his particular circumstances.
It restores him to the economic status he would have occupied had the
compensable event not occurred. And even though in some instances
no kind of award will restore him physically and socially, an individualized system may provide a money award to "compensate" for
irreparable physical and social consequences. There is no inevitable
link between individualization of benefits and the criteria for determining who is to receive benefits, but the historical fact is that AngloAmerican fault-and-liability-insurance systems (including the systems
for automobile accidents and medical accidents) have provided for
individualized compensation. They have been criticized for failing in
fact to fufill this promise,lil but in theory the promise is clearly made.
One objection to individualizing compensation has been its price
in higher administrative cost. In addition, inequities may occur in the
administration of a system that in theory individualizes compensation
because in practice the system's loss adjusters (insurers' representatives in a system funded by insurance) will resort to standardized
rules of thumb. And the goal of individualized compensation may be
attacked on what is perhaps a more fundamental, and certainly a more
controversial, ground-that it uses the compensation system to preserve and reinforce inequities in the social and economic circumstances5
that different persons occupied before compensable events occurred. 3
5o See, e.g., H. Ross, SETTLED OUT op CoURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INsURANCE
CLAims ADJUSTMENT 23 (1970) (opposing individualization). But see CoTENSATioN
SYsTEMs, supra note 5, at 81-83 (favoring individualization).
51
Perhaps the most thoroughly documented criticism is that persons sustaining
minor injuries generally receive "compensation" for "pain and suffering" that is disproportionately high in comparison with the compensation received for the more severe
pain and suffering- of more seriously injured victims. See, e.g., the reports of empirical
studies
cited in notes 14-15 supra.
52
See, e.g., H. Ross, supra note 50, at 23.
53An illustration in point arose in a class discussion in which a student argued
that compensation for loss arising from disability to work is fairer when awarded on a
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From the affirmative perspective, then, proponents of standardized
compensation may assert that it is more equitable as well as more
efficient in its use of those resources society allocates to the compensation system.
Fault-and-liability-insurance systems, as already noted, have
typically emphasized individualization of benefits, depending on caseby-case determinations of what constitutes fair and reasonable compensation for the losses sustained. Even though such a system may
depart in practice from its theory-especially by overpaying trivial
claims and giving greater weight in negotiated settlements to the
so-called "specials" than the theory of the system supports-still the
strong tendency toward individualizing damages remains. This tendency is most apparent and its impact is most dramatic in litigated
cases of severe injury. Some nonfault systems offer a similar individualization of benefits and others depend more upon standardized
(and sometimes scheduled) benefits. Social security systems have
typically gone much further toward standardizing benefits and avoiding the costs of individualized determinations. Thus, although it would
be possible to have standardized benefits under a fault system or individualized benefits under a social security system, the tendency is
strongly the other way. By tendency, then, administrative costs of
determining benefits run highest in fault-and-liability-insurance systems, lowest in social security systems, and at an intermediate level
for nonfault systems.
One might expect that, in converse, equity among victims would
be best served by a fault-and-liability-insurance system because it
expends more administrative costs in the effort. In fact, however, the
high costs of trial in a fault-and-liability-insurance system have a significant impact on the practical operation of the system. It is significant, also, that the nature of this impact may vary in different faultand-liability-insurance systems. As noted earlier in this Article,54 the
practical impact of this factor in medical malpractice litigation is quite
different from its practical impact in automobile accident litigation.
In the system for compensating traffic victims the high cost of defense
confers on every trivial claim a high nuisance value that greatly impairs the effectiveness of the system in doing equity as between those
suffering minor injuries and those more seriously injured. Thus, one
of the major reasons for shifting from a fault to a nonfault system for
standardized basis of a specified sum per week or month than when based on what the
disabled person's respective earnings would have been, because the latter basis reflects
social and economic discrimination against women.
G#See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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compensating traffic victims has been to correct the inequity of overcompensation for minor injuries and undercompensation for more
serious injuries.
In contrast, in the medical malpractice system, physicians can be
and are more insistent on defense, the claimant's chances of overcoming legal barriers to making a case for the jury are much smaller,
and insurers are more resistant to settlement. In this context, the high
cost of litigation is a formidable barrier to the assertion of claims for
minor or moderate injury, and the practical inequity among claimants
is that those having minor or moderate injury tend to be denied compensation altogether while those suffering serious injury have at least
a substantial, and probably increasing, prospect of adequate to generous compensation.
If a nonfault system undertakes to individualize compensation,
it cannot escape the significant administrative cost of doing so. Proponents of individualized compensation-whether under a fault or
under a nonfault system-see this cost as a reasonable one to pay for
equity among victims. Typically a social security system is more efficient because it is more standardized, usually at a level nearer the
minimum than the maximum of losses of all victims receiving the
standard level of benefits. If a social security system undertakes to
pay more than subsistence-level or minimal benefits and to give more
attention to individualizing them, its overhead goes up in two ways.
First, it incurs the cost of determining losses case by case. Second,
the cost of protecting against fraudulent or exaggerated claims increases as benefits for disability approach what the claimant could
make by returning to work.
To a considerable extent, then, equity has its price, whatever the
basic character of the system may be. Internalizing costs of risky
activities and individualizing benefits to victims increase overhead,
regardless of whether the system is a government-operated social
security system or a private enterprise insurance system. Particular
resolutions of cost-equity problems such as these are not inevitable
concomitants of a choice among the three major sets of principles
underlying fault, nonfault insurance, and social security systems. By
tendency, however, social security systems commonly place a lower
value on internalizing costs and individualizing benefits and operate
with the lowest overhead in claims administration.
It would seem that marketing costs (or "acquisition" costs as
they are called in the insurance industry) are inevitably greater in a
private enterprise insurance system, whether fault or nonfaut, than
any corresponding or analogous costs in a social security system. How-
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ever, most published data on the percentages of administrative cost
of various systems 55 tend to exaggerate this difference. The overhead
of a social security system is often understated because of the omission of hidden, externalized costs of performing a function for the
system analogous to the function performed by the sales agent in a
private enterprise insurance system that markets policies through
agents. For example, published figures seldom include even an estimate, much less a documented calculation, of the cost to employers
of administering the collection system for contributions to the social
security fund. In contrast, the percentage of overhead of private enterprise insurance systems that is due to acquisition costs is well documented in general and perhaps moderately well documented in relation
to different marketing patterns-for example, marketing through individual policies compared with group marketing, and "independent
agency" marketing (through agents each of whom represents many
companies and has some choice with respect to where he places the
bulk of the policies he sells) compared with "direct writing" (through
agents each of whom represents only one insurance company). Also,
the contrast between the relatively high overhead of private enterprise
insurance and the relatively low overhead of social security systems
has been reduced somewhat in recent years with the increase of group
insurance not only in nonfault insurance coverages but even in fault
insurance coverages. It must be expected, nevertheless, that social
security systems will continue to have a cost advantage in this respect.
To be complete, a comparison among systems must also take
account of some deep-seated political preferences that may outweigh
all but the most compelling cost comparisons. A preference having
special impact on choices regarding compensation systems in the
United States is the preference for private enterprise over government
enterprise.5 6
III.

CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS

In the dim, distant past of the 1960's, when a nonfault automobile
insurance system was only a dream for the future, the "bathtub argument" was part of the stock-in-trade of those who opposed nonfault
1
plans.57
"If we are to compensate an automobile accident victim with55 See, e.g., A. COaARD, J. Mo RoA, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ, & R. BozmAuOEr, AuTOmORH.E ACCiDENT COSTS AND PAYAmNTS 52-66 (1964).
56
This preference has been succinctly explained in N.Y. Iws. DFm'T REPORT, supra
note 11, at 77-78.
57
An early proponent of loss insurance had observed the use of the "bathtub argument" even before the 1960's. Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident
Victims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 Omo ST.
L.J. 134, 148 (1954).
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out regard to fault," they asked rhetorically, "why not also the person
who slips and falls in his bathtub?"
One advantage of a rhetorical question is its versatility. Each
person who reads or hears it can take it the full limits of its credibility
for him. To the cautious, the argument inferred from the bathtub
question was that, as a matter of equity, we should not reform our
system for compensating traffic victims unless we were prepared to
give like treatment to victims of accidents in the home. Daring interpreters, on the other hand, inferred a more sweeping argument;
reform no part of the compensation system unless you are prepared to
apply the same principles of reform to all of it. The advocates of the
status quo thus used the rhetorical question to invoke against any
proposal for departing from the fault-and-liability-insurance system in
one area not only the opposition to reform in other specific areas but
also the formidable opposition that can be marshaled against the most
complete and comprehensive departure from fault law-that is, a
broadly inclusive social security system.
Today, when nonfault automobile insurance laws have been enacted in several states and are expected soon in others, the bathtub
question has different nuances. One might even take it not as a rhetorical argument but as a serious invitation for a reasoned response. To
the daring interpreter who takes the question most broadly, it inquires:
should we not have a comprehensive social security system to compensate for all accidental injuries, and perhaps as well for other misfortunes such as illness?"8 There are distinguished advocates for an
affirmative answer to this question59 and at least one legislative action
that may be seen as implementing an affirmative answer for accidental
injuries, though not for other misfortunes. 0 In the long range, along
with others,"' I believe this is an open question. In contrast, it seems
58 The claims on society of the victims of illness as well as the victims of accidents
are dramatically illustrated by the consequences of catastrophic illness. One of the significant gaps of insurance coverage in our society has been the lack of adequate coverage
for the risk that a catastrophic illness will exhaust a family's resources, including savings.
Cf. S. SRncxAND, U.S. BEATim CARE 14 (1972):
In 1972, the nation will spend an estimated $72 billion for all health
purposes. A central problem, however, is that the recent large additional expenditures have not bought unqualifiedly better health for all the people, but
have largely gone to keep pace with price inflation....
There are other evidences of problems with American health care ...
Another is a phenomenon familiar to many Americans, though fortunately it is
a secondhand familiarity to most: the destruction of a family's savings when a
catastrophic illness such as cancer strikes.
59
See, e.g., sources cited note 30 supra. Cf. Blum & Kalven, A Stopgap Plan for
Compensating Auto Accident Victims, 1968 INs. L.J. 661 (observing that "grand scale
developments" of the social-insurance type may be some time away and referring to
contemporaneous discussion of plans for compensation of traffic victims as "provincial") ;
Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 AIIcH. L. Rav. 279 (1964).
60 Accident Compensation Act 1972 (New Zealand).
61
See, e.g., G. CATABRnS, supra note 33, at 317-18.
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nearly certain that our society will not preserve the fault-and-liabilityinsurance system as the principal method of compensating accident
victims of all types.
In focusing, then, on the question whether the principles of a nonfault insurance system should be extended to the compensation of
victims of accidental injuries incurred during medical treatment, we
must be concerned not only with the balance of advantages between
fault and nonfault systems but also with the balance of advantages
between nonfault insurance and social security systems.
Empirical data in abundance have informed and enlightened
legislative choices in relation to reform of the automobile accident
reparation system. No such data are readily available with regard to
the medical malpractice reparation system. Choices made at this point
are therefore somewhat more speculative. One response to this circumstance might be to propose postponement of legislative choices on
the ground that more information is needed. But this is not necessarily
the wisest response. All major legislative choices are made on the basis
of incomplete information about what their consequences will be.
It may reasonably be argued that there is sufficient information to
support immediate legislative choices in this area, even though they
will be less fully informed choices than it has been possible to make
concerning the automobile accident reparation system.
Perhaps the most troublesome problem facing those who propose
to adopt a nonfault insurance system for medical accidents in place
of the existing malpractice liability insurance system is the causation
issue. In the automobile accident context, nonfault plans commonly
employ the phrase "arising out of the maintenance or use" of a motor
vehicle,62 or some variation on this basic theme, to identify the covered
losses. The number of instances in which it may reasonably be disputed whether a particular loss falls within or outside the definition
of the requisite causal relation will be few. The administrative cost
of resolving disputes in those few instances will be only a minute
percentage of the total cost of the system. In contrast, losses "arising
from mistake or accident occurring during medical treatment" (or
within some alternative definition of the required causal relation) 63
would be more difficult to distinguish from losses resulting from the
62

.g., UNiFoRA MOTOR VEniCLE AccIDENT REPARATIoNS Act § 2.

63Some commentators have suggested a criterion of "deviation" from expected
results in lieu of a criterion concerned with whether the condition complained of "arises
from" or is "caused" by "mistake," or "accident," or some "deviational" aspect of
medical treatment. E.g., MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at 5, 13, 15-24, 28. Application of
any of these varied criteria would often involve a clash of expert testimony, but the
particular way the criterion is formulated may have some impact on the frequency of
cases in which dispute and uncertainty of outcome are likely.
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preexisting condition for which medical treatment was given, and this
difficult causation issue would be present usually rather than unusually.
The resolution of these case-by-case disputes would involve substantial
administrative costs in the nonfault system, even though somewhat
lower costs than those incurred in a malpractice system (which must
resolve not only a causation issue similar to this one but also a negligence issue in each case). Thus, here as in the automobile accident
area, a nonfault system falls between a fault-and-liability-insurance
system and a social security system in relation to the percentage of
the total cost that goes to pay for administration. But the advantage
of a social security over a nonfault system in this one particular is
more substantial and the advantage of a nonfault over a fault system
is less substantial for the area of medical accidents than for the area
of automobile accidents.
Proponents of either a nonfault system or a social security system
must answer another difficult question regarding the adequacy of
their provisions for compensating both economic losses and those
kinds of deprivations and disadvantages now compensated under the
rubric of "general damages" or "pain and suffering." Until very recently, the medical malpractice system was heavily weighted against
any recovery by claimants, and high compensation in the few cases
that overcame all the barriers did not add great costs to the system.
As the weighting has shifted toward the claimant's side in recent years
and more cases have overcome the less formidable barriers to compensation, costs have risen sharply. Much of the impetus for reform at
this time thus arises from interests in controlling costs. 4 This background for proposals of nonfault insurance for medical accidents contrasts in some degree with the background for adopting nonfault
automobile insurance. The original impetus for reform in the automobile area was one of concern more for the treatment of victims
than for controlling costs. It certainly is the case, however, that the
political success of the movement for nonfault automobile insurance
has owed much to the probability of reduced insurance costs for
motorists. A sharp contrast remains, nevertheless, in another respect.
Hopes for overall cost reductions from adopting a nonfault insurance
system seem realistic in relation to traffic accidents. But in the absence
of severe limitations on benefits-limitations not only against general
damages but also against full recovery for economic losses-these
hopes seem unrealistic in relation to medical accidents.
It seems highly probable that from the long-term perspective the
system for paying health-care costs will cover the costs of added treat64

See note 10 supra.
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ment that a patient needs because he is the victim of a medical
accident. This policy choice is strongly supported by the advantages
of bypassing difficult causation issues encountered in any fault or
nonfault system of compensation for medical accidents-advantages
that heavily outweigh the costs of paying for those incremental medical services attributable to injuries arising from medical accidents
rather than other sources. And it seems appropriate to take action at
least to this extent contemporaneously with any action establishing a
national health insurance system. That is, whatever the choice may
be between public and private funding of a national health plan, its
benefits should extend to medical needs attributable to mistakes or
accidents in the course of treatment as well as needs arising from
other causes. More debatable is the question whether it is feasible
and desirable to include in the national health plan some compensation
for other economic losses and general damages resulting from medical
accidents. On the basis of the limited empirical data now available,
costs of including compensation beyond a subsistence level, even for
wage losses, are likely to be viewed in the legislative arena as prohibitive. Those costs do not disappear by being omitted from the
compensation system, however, and it would seem appropriate to
preserve a private remedy for victims who sustain such losses.
It is at this point that the contrast between cost estimates for
fault and nonfault systems becomes potentially decisive. Again our
data are limited, and estimates may change as we become better informed. For the present, it appears that a shift from fault to nonfault
as the basis for the private remedy in the medical accident field, rather
than leading to improved efficiency and lower overall costs, would
lead to only slight improvement in efficiency and to substantially
higher overall costs. Nor can one find in a nonfault proposal such
significant advances toward equity as can be claimed for a nonfaut
system's correction of the inequitable overpayment of claims for minor
injuries sustained in automobile accidents. It is true that the incidence
of nonpayment for injuries from medical accidents is far greater for
minor and moderate injuries than for those that are severe. But,
disturbing as this feature of the system is, it is less so than the reverse
inequity of the automobile accident system. If our system treats differently injuries of different severity, surely it is better to do disproportionately more than to do disproportionately less for those who
are victims of the more severe injuries. This is not to say, however,
that the fault remedy should remain unchanged. Here, as in the automobile reparations system, we should avoid the wasteful costs of overIapping- remedies, with the associated consequences of either over-
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lapping payments to victims or increased administrative costs of
second-round loss shifting by subrogation or otherwise. Thus, it would
seem that any enactment establishing either social security or nonfault benefits for medical expenses or for subsistence level benefits
beyond medical expenses should provide for restrictions to some extent
against awards of damages based on fault. And any enactment of this
type might appropriately authorize and encourage private contracts
for greater restriction of damages based on fault, within regulated
limits, in return for greater nonfault benefits than the law requires.
These voluntary elements of nonfault coverage would offer limited
advantages immediately, and data concerning their practical performance might contribute in the future to better informed decisions
about compensation for medical accidents.

